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PERIODIC TENANT'S REPAIR OBLIGATION IN
ABSENCE OF COVENANT
I.

INTRODUCTION

The question to be considered here is the extent of the repair obligation of a periodic tenant in the absence of any covenant defining
such repair obligation. The short- and medium-term periodic tenancy
has become increasingly common in the experience of the average
American city-dweller. Textwriters have recognized its sociological
importance.
"The common varieties of estates from period to period are
the estate from year to year, from month to month, and from
week to week. In rare instances an estate from day to day is
found.
"These estates include the arrangements under which the
majority of our urban dwellers live. Persons in the lower income
groups-even those in the lower middle income groups-do not
customarily occupy under written leases or have estates for
years. They "rent" a space in which to live, agreeing to pay so
much ever), week or every month, out of the periodically received pay check or pay envelope. Duration of the occupancy is
undisclosed.
"This type of estate is tremendously important sociologically
in that occupancy thereunder conditions the home life of a very
substantial fraction of the population. On the other hand, the
financial smallness of the involved rights results in a great dearth
of reported decisions from the courts concerning them. Their
legal consequences are chiefly based in the "over the counter"
mass handling of "landlord and tenant" cases of the local courts.
So this type of estate, judged socialogically, is of great importance, but judged on the basis of its jurisprudential content, is
almost negligible."
The sociological importance of these estates has also been noted in an
article in the FORDHAM LAW REVIEW wherein it is said:
"The length of the term of moderately and low priced apartments is commonly left to the whim of the gods, but the rent
is "so much" per month. In an industrial democracy the individual may well be chary of tying himself down as a tenant
to any one place-his job may be here today, elsewhere the next
or gone entirely. If he works his income is wont to be regular
and fixed in weekly or biweekly units; his abilitiy to pay rent
from month to month varies little. The month is likely to be the
measure of his obligation to pay rent. Under such circumstances,
and, in general, in the absence of countervailing indicia, a tenancy from month to month would seem called for whenever the
only indication of the term is the monthly rental payments." 2
1 2 Powell, REAL PROPERTY 373 (1954).

2 7 FORDHA.

L. REV. 167 (1938).
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Because of this sociological importance of periodic tenancies and
the paucity of written authority from appellate courts concerning the
repair obligation of tenants holding under them in the absence of
covenant, this article will attempt to discover some of the more important factors which the courts have considered in defining this
obligation on the part of the tenant.
II. HIsTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Before attempting to set forth any of the rules as they exist today,
it would be profitable to examine the historical aspect of the law in this
area. By the rule of the ancient common law,3 a tenant for life, or for
years, or at will was not liable for waste. At this time, no mention was
made of the periodic tenant because the periodic tenancy did not appear upon the scene until the sixteenth century. It is said by Holdsworth that:
"It was in the course of the sixteenth
' 4 century that the estate
from year to year made its appearance.
The reasons why tenants for life, or for years, or at will were not
liable for waste were twofold: (1) these tenancies were created by
act of the parties and if the landlord desired to hold the tenant liable
for waste he should have so stipulated in the lease; (2) the acts of
waste on the part of the tenant at will terminated his estate. He became a mere trespasser instead of a tenant.
The first reason is indicated by the writings of the authorities in
this area. It is said in the AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAw that:
"At the common law, a tenant for life or years was not liable
ior waste, because it was presumed that the demise or lease
creating his estate would have provided against waste if it
were to be prohibited.. .. "5
Kent and Thompson indicate the same reason in their works.
"At common law, no prohibition against waste lay against
the lessee for life or years, deriving his interest from the act of
the party. The remedy was confined to those tenants who derived
their interest from the act of the law; .... "6
"....

waste would not lie at common law, against the lessee

for life or for years; for' 7 the lessor might have restrained him
by covenant or condition.
"At common law, the only parties liable for waste were
tenants of legal estates, i.e., estates which were created by act
of law as distinguished from those created by act of the
parties.""
3 Prior to 1267.

4 7 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 243 (1924).
5 28 Am. & ENG. ENcYc. LAW 891 (1st ed. 1895).
6 4 KENT'S Comm. 78 (rev. ed. 1892).
7Id. at 81.
8 4 Thompson, REAL PROPERTY 105 (perm. ed. 1940).
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The second reason exists where the tenant holds as a tenant at will.
In the case of such a tenant, an act which would otherwise constitute
waste terminates the tenancy and thus the tenant is no longer a tenant
and cannot be held liable for waste as such. He becomes a mere
trespasser, and there is a possibility that he may be held liable in
trespass. 9 This is indicated in COKE'S COMM2NENTARY upon Littleton
when he says:
"But if tenant at will commit voluntary waste, as in pulling
down of houses, or in felling of trees, it is said that the lessor
shall have an action of trespass for this against the lessee."' 0
"And true it is, that if tenant at will cutteth down timber
trees, or voluntarily pull down and prostrate houses, the lessor
shall have an action of trespasse against him, quare vi et armis;
for the taking upon him power to cut timber, or prostrate
houses, concerneth so much the freehold and inheritance, as it
doth amount in law to a determination of his will; and so hath
it beene adjuged." 11
2
This is also stated by modern textwriters.
The ancient common law rule was changed with the passage of a
statute. The Statute of Marlbridge 13 provided:
"Also fermors (firmarii) during their terms shall not make
waste, sale nor exile of houses, wood and men, nor of anything
belonging to the tenements they have to ferm, without special
license had by writing of covenant making mention that they
may do it; if they do and thereof be convict, they shall yield
full damage and shall be punished by amerciament greviously.' 14
The Statute of Gloucester provided:
"That a man from henceforth shall have a writ of waste in
chancery against him that holdeth by law of England, or otherwise for a term of life, or for a term of years, or a woman in
dower; and he which shall be attainted of waste shall lose the
thing that he hath wasted, and moreover
shall recompense thrice
15
so much as the waste shall be taxed at."'
These statutes have been commonly construed as making a tenant
for life or for years liable for waste. Thus, it is said that:
"... the common law was changed by the statutes of Marlbridge
(52 HEN. 3) and Gloucester (6 EDW. 1, ch. 5), and tenants for
life and years were made liable for waste." 16
9 See Chalmers v. Smith, 152 Mass. 561, 26 N.E. 95 (1891) ; where it is said that
a tenant at will who commits waste is liable to his landlord in an action of

trespass quare clausum-his act terminates his rights as a tenant and entitles
the landlord to treat him as a trespasser.
10 1 Co. LiTT. 71 (19th ed. 1853).
11 Ibid.
12 Burby, REAL PROPERTY 43 n. 37 (2d ed. 1954).

13 1267, 52 HEN. III, c. 23.
1-4
The translation is Coke's, 2 Co. INST. 145 (2d ed. 1836).
1 1278, 6 EDw. I, c. 5.
16 Supra, note 5.
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The Statute of Marlbridge was the basic one which accomplished this
purpose. The term "firmarii" within it was interpreted to include both
tenants for years and for life.' 7 The Statute of Gloucester merely
created a new procedure, the writ of waste, and a new remedy,
treble damages and forfeiture. It is doubtful that it broadened the
group of persons liable for waste or varied the determination of
what acts were waste. Its effect was merely to provide a new procedure
and a new remendy's
Although these Statutes made tenants for life and for years liable
for waste, they did not affect tenants at will.
"Tenants in dower, by the curtesy, for life or lives, and for
years, were included in the Statute of Gloucester. Tenants at will
were always considered as omitted from the Statute of Marlbridge, as well as from the statute of Gloucester, and, therefore,
continued not to be punishable for ...

waste,....19

This is also stated by a well known English textwriter2 0 and a classic
English case.

2

1

III. NATURE OF PERIODIC TENANCY
Before attempting to discover what are the present rules concerning periodic tenancies, it would be well to examine the nature of a
periodic tenancy and determine whether it more closely approximates
a tenancy for years or a tenancy at will. It is defined by Tiffany 2 as:
"... all tenancies which are in their nature such as will endure
for a certain period, and will continue for subsequent successive
periods of the same length unless terminated by due notice, at
the end either of the first period or one of the successive
periods."
"It was in the course of the sixteenth century that the estate
from year to year made its appearance. The creation of these
estates, rather than estates at will, was probably due to the inconvenience of estates at will. The tenant at will had no certain
interest; and his right to emblements made the land of very
little value to the landlord,who was practically deprived of the rent
of the land while the right to emblements lasted. It was better,
both from the point of view of tenant and of the landlord, that
the tenant should have a better defined interest. From the point
of view of the tenant, because he had a more assured position;
and from the point of view of the landlord,
because he was
23
entitled to rent to the end of the term."
.. .both Coke and Blackstone interpreted the term "firmarii" to include both
tenants for years and for life." 5 Ami. LAWOF PROPERTY 109 (1st ed. 1952).
IsThis is the interpretation given it by the authors of Ai. LAw OF PROPERTY, id.
at 110.
19 4 Thompson, op. cit. supra note 8, at 113.
20 3 Holdswortb, op. cit. supra note 4, at 125.
21 The Countess of Shrewsbury's Case, 5 Coke 14, 77 Eng. Rep. 68.
22 1 Tiffany, REAL PROPERTY 264 (3rd ed. 1939).
23 7 Holdswortb, op. cit. supra note 4, at 243.
17
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The periodic tenancy arises today in four principal situations: (1)
where the parties expressly create one; (2) where there is no original
letting for a definite period and the acts of the parties create a tenancy
the duration of which is not predetermined, but the year or a fraction
thereof is the basis upon which the rent is paid; (3) where there is a
valid lease for a definite term but a holdover takes place and with
the consent of the landlord the tenant continues to occupy the premises
paying periodic rent; (4) where there is a lease which is invalid under
24
the Statute of Frauds but the lessee occupies and pays periodic rent.
It can readily be seen that the periodic tenancy came into being
for an express purpose-to remedy some of the evils of the tenancy
at will. Since it was created to avoid the evils of the tenancy at will it
seems absurd to attempt to say that it is nothing more than a tenancy
at will in disguise. Rather, it seems that the better view is that a periodic
tenancy is essentially a tenancy for years. The important distinguishing characteristic is the specific date at which it can be terminated.
This view has been expressed by legal writers. In an article in the
FoRDHAm LAW REVIEW, Philip Marcus states that:
"It would seem ... improper to categorize periodic tenancies
as merely a form of the tenancy at will. The established place
which the periodic tenancy occupies in the classification of estates
in land and in the law of landlord and tenant merit its consideration as something more than a tenancy at will. There are several
incidents attached to this form of tenancy which are not re'
produced in a tenancy at will."'25
Tiffany, Powell, and THE AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY adopt much
the same view:
"A tenancy from year to year, though resembling in some
degree a tenancy at will, in that the continuance of the holding
beyond the end of any year is dependent on the will of the
parties, nevertheless resembles a tenancy for years rather than
a tenancy at will, in that it is a tenancy for one year at least."2
"While the estate from period to period lasts, the lessor and
the lessee have a relationship substantially identical with that...
concerning estates for years. The rules . . . on the lessee's right
to the possession and use of the premises, the location of responsibility27 for repairs and for the condition of the premises
all apply.
"As developed by the parties and the courts, periodic tenancies, except as 2to termination, have the same incidents as
estates for years.1
24 These categories are suggested in: 7 FORDHAM L. REV. 167 (1938).
25Ibid., The incidents mentioned are: (1) Necessity of notice to terminate;
(2) Right to assign without the lessor's consent; (3) Effect of death of either
party.

381 (1954).
381 (1954).

1 Tiffany, REAL PROPERTY
27 2 Powell, REAL PROPERTY
28 1 Ams. LAW OF PROPERTY 222
26

(1st ed. 1952).
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In order to uphold the view that a periodic tenancy more closely resembles a tenancy for years than it does a tenancy at will, the state29
ment of the Wisconsin Court in the case of Sutherland v. Drolet
must be distinguished. The Court there said that a periodic tenancy
is nothing more than a modified form of a tenancy at will. This case
can be distinguished on the ground that the Court was only speaking
of the meaning of "periodic tenancy" under the Wisconsin statute
dealing with the termination of tenancies2 ° It seems that the Court
was attempting to correct an oversight of the Legislature in omitting
to mention periodic tenancies in Sec. 234.03, Wis. STATS. It desired
to protect periodic tenants by bringing periodic tenancies within the
section, and it did so by saying that the periodic tenancy is nothing
more than a modified form of the tenancy at will, which is covered
by the statute.

IV.

GENERAL RULES

In setting forth the general rules concerning the repair obligations
of a periodic tenant in the absence of covenant the tendency of the
courts has been to speak in very general and ambiguous terms. They
have recognized two varieties of implied covenants. 31 Some courts and
textwriters have used the language used in an early Pensylvania decision which said:
"A tenant is bound to commit no waste, and to make fair and
tenantable repairs ..... "32
Other courts and textwriters have used language similar to that of an
early New York case:
"There is an implied covenant in every hiring that the tenant
will surrender the premises at the end of the term in as good
condition as they were at the commencement of the term ..... ,3
29
30

154 Wis. 619, 143 N.Y. 663 (1913).
WIs. STATS. §234.03 (1955) : Tenacies, how terminated.

"Whenever there is a tenancy at will or by sufferance, created in any manner,
the same may be terminated by giving at least 30 days' notice in writing to the
tenant requiring him to remove from the demised premises, or by the tenant's
giving at least 30 days' notice in writing that he shall remove from said
premises, and by surrendering to the landlord the possession thereof within
the time limited in such notice; but when the rent reserved in a lease at will
is payable at periods of less than one month such notice shall be sufficient if
it be equal to at least the interval between the times of payment; and in all
cases of neglect or refusal to pay the rent due on a lease at will at least 14
days' notice to remove given by the landlord, shall be sufficient to determine
the lease."
31 Infra, note 73.
32 Long v. Fitzimmons, 1 Watts. & S. 530 (1841), at 532. Other courts and textwriters using similar language: Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N.Y. 450 (1873);
U.S. v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53 (1876); Warren v. Wagner. 75 Ala. 188 (1883);
Van Wormer v. Crane, 51 Mich. 363, 16 N.W. 683 (1883); Patton v. U.S.,
139 F. Supp. 279 (1955) ; 4 Thompson, REAL PROPERTY 111 (perm. ed. 1940) ; 1
Washburn, REAL PROPERTY 501 (6th ed. 1902).
3 Myers v. Hussenburth, 65 N.Y. Supp. 1026 (1900). Other courts and textwriters using similar language: Carlin v. Ritter, 68 Md. 478, 13 Atl. 370
(1888) ; Earle v. Arbogast, 180 Pa. 409, 36 Atl. 923 (1897) ; lansfield Motors
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The source of this implied obligation of which the courts and textwriters speak is indicated in the case of Van Wormer v. Crane31 wherein it is said:
"The bare relation of landlord and tenant is a sufficient
consideration for an implied promise to treat the premises ocand to make the
upied . . . in a good and proper manner, ....
"
ordinary repairs thereto ....
In setting forth the general rule, the courts have also set forth
various exceptions thereto. Thus, it has been said that the tenant's
implied obligation to make repairs or to surrender the premises in the
same condition as when received does not extend to a situation where
the condition necessitating the repairs is: (1) the result of ordinary
wear and tear ;35 (2) the result of unavoidable accident or act of God ;3G
(3) within the class known as general or substantial repairs ;37 (4) due
3 s
to the landlord's negligence.
The courts refer to this failure on the part of the tenant to make
ordinary tenantable repairs, or to return the premises in as good a
condition as when received, as waste. Waste:
may be defined to be any act or ommision of duty by a
tenant of land which does a lasting injury to the freehold, tends
to the permanent loss of the owner of the fee, or to destroy or
lessen the value of an inheritance, or to destroy the identity of
the property or impair the evidence of title." 30
Two varieties of waste have been recognized:
"Waste is divided into two classes, voluntary waste, which usually consists of affirmative acts on the part of the tenant in posv. Freer, 42 Ohio App. 214, 182 N.E. 51 (1932) ; U.S. v. Jordan, 186 F.2d 803
(1951); Rountree v. Thompson, 226 N.C. 553, 39 S.E. 2d. 523 (1946); 32
AM. JuR.,

LANDLORD & TENANT

665.

Supra, note 32.
35 Rountree v. Thompson, supra, note 33; 4 Thompson, supra, note 32; 1
Washburn, supra, note 32.
36 Rountree v. Thompson, supra, note 33, at 525, holds that:
, extend to the loss of buildings by
"The implied covenant does not ...
fire, flood, tempest, or enemies which it was not in the power of the lessee
to prevent, and there is no implied covenant that the lessee shall restore the
buildings which have been destroyed by accident without fault on his part
• . . destruction by the act of God, or by the public enemy, or by accident,
or by the act of the lessor, are exculpatory exceptions to the general rule
of liability."
37 Gott v. Gandy, 2 El. & RI. 845, 118 Eng. Rep. 984 (1853) ; Deutsch v. Abeles,
15 Mo. App. 398 (1884).
3s Stevens v. Schweizer, 94 Misc. Rep. 646, 158 N.Y. Supp. 465 (1916).
394 Thompson, op. cit. supra, note 32, at 104. Another definition of waste is
given in Graffell v. Honeysuckle, 30 Wash. 2d 390, 191 P. 2d 858 (1948),
at 863:
"Waste,..., is an unreasonable or improper use, abuse, mismanagement, or
omission of duty touching real estate by one rightfully in possession which
results in its substantial injury. It is the violation of an obligation to treat
the premises in such manner that no harm be done to them and that the
estate may revert to those having an underlying interest undeteriorated by
any wilfull or negligent act."
34
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session, causing damages to the premises, and permissive waste,
which involves acts of
40 ommission rather than commision on the
part of such tenant."
These definitions seem to indicate that any time the force which
caused the damage had its origin in some act on the part of the tenant,
the case will be one of voluntary waste. Thus, if a tenant be chopping
wood and negligently allows the ax to slip out of his hand and break
a window, this would seem to be a case of voluntary waste. It would
be an affirmative act on the part of the tenant which results in damage
to the premises. This limits the area of permissive waste to cases in
which the force which caused the damage to the premises is some person or thing other than the tenant.
It seems that any time the courts can find that the force which
caused the damage had its origin in some act on the part of the tenant,
which enables them to classify the case as one of a voluntary waste,
they will hold the tenant liable for repairs.
"The rule has been declared in general terms that a tenant, no
is liable to his landlord
matter what the duration of his term,
4
for voluntary or commissive waste."

1

In an early United States Supreme Court case 42 involving a periodic tenancy with no covenants as to repairs the tenant tore up gardens
and tore down certain fences and walls without the permission of the
landlord. The landlord was allowed to recover for damage done to
the property on the ground that the destruction of the garden, fences
and walls constituted voluntary waste and was a violation of the implied covenant to exercise reasonable care to prevent damage to the
inheritance.
In the Massachusetts case of Chalners v.Smit 43 the tenant overloaded a barn which was only meant for the storage of hay. He stored
heavier materials in it and the building was damaged by reason of
the weight. The court allowed the landlord to recover the damages.
It held that this constituted voluntary waste - it was a positive unreasonable act of a kind likely to cause damage to the landlord's property.
An early New York case 44 considered the question of whether the
periodic tenant could be held for voluntary waste when the actual act
Tiffany, REAL PROPERTY 630 (3rd ed. 1939).
Thompson, REAL PROPERTY 113 (Derm. ed. 1940); accord, Corvell v. Snyder,
15 Cal. App. 634, 115 Pac. 961 (1911); White v. Wagner, 4 Harr. & J.373
App. 226 (1890) ; Powell v. Dayton, S.
(1818) ; Boefer v. Sheridan, 42 M-fo.
& G.R. Co., 16 Or. 33, 16 Pac. 863 (1888) ; Kingston v. Lehigh Val. Coal Co.,
236 Pa. 350, 84 Atl. 820 (1912).
42 U.S. v. Bostwick, supra, note 32.
43
Supra, note 9.
44
Regan v. Luthy, 11 N.Y. Supp. 709 (1890).

40 2
4"4
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which caused the waste was committed by an unknown third person.
In that case, the tenant moved out and closed up the house; within a
few days the plumbing was cut out. The court held that this, even
though the act of strangers, constituted voluntary waste. An early
Maryland case held the tenant liable for voluntary waste when the
house held by him was destroyed by an armed mob. The court said
that the tenant had used the house for a different purpose than that
for which it was leased and the acts of the mob, provoked by the
acts of the tenant, must be imputable to the tenant. 45 Thus, it seems
that the courts will in some cases go to the extent of saying that acts
of a stranger which would constitute voluntary waste if performed by
the tenant may be imputable to the tenant so as to hold him liable for
voluntary waste.
The fact situations become less definite, as do the courts, in the
area of permissive waste. Because of this, it is important to look
into the fact situations and attempt to determine what factors the
courts have weighed in determining whether or not to hold the tenant
liable.
The fundamental consideration under the modern law is that in order to sustain a finding of permissive waste, it must appear that the
tenant was negligent. This has been indicated by modern authorities.46
It is said in AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY that:
"The decisions seem to establish clearly that liability for permissive waste turns upon proof of the existence of a duty to repair, and resulting
injury to the inheritance for falure to per47
form that duty.

45 White v. Wagner, supra, note 41; (Tenant used building for purposes of
distribution of political newspaper; building destroyed by mob).
46 In Beekman v. Dolsen, 63 Hun. 487, 18 N.Y. Supp. 376 (1892), at 377, it is

said:

"Permissive waste implies negligence, which may consist either of acquiesence or assent in the acts of strangers, or failure to prevent such acts,
or to do that which is incumbent upon the party in possession as matter
of good husbandry. But the very essence of liability for permissive waste
must be negligence."
Accord:
Rogers v. Atl., G. & P. Co., 213 N.Y. 246 (1915).
Burby, REAL PROPERTY 36 (2d ed. 1954) ; states:
"An injury which results from the occupant's mere failure to act,
when it was his duty to act, is permissive waste."
It is stated in an article in the COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW that:
"The cases of waste for non repair ...,are all grounded on the destruction or dilapidation resulting from the tenant's default." 8 COL. L. REV.
628 (1908).
Mansfield Motors v. Freer, supra, note 33; in this case, the court refused
to allow the landlord to recover damages for a broken window because of
a failure on his part to show that it had been broken through the negligence of the tenant.
475 A~N. LAW OF PROPERTY 101 (lst ed. 1952).
This statement corresponds to the elements listed by Prosser as being necessary to sustain a finding of negligence: (1) a legal duty to conform to a
standard of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable risks;
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This is a relatively modem doctrine which did not exist at the ancient common law, under which the strict rules favoring the landlord
had their origin. Its importance fiom the viewpoint of the tenant cannot be overstressed. Its very existence indicates that the landlord will
no longer be able to hold the tenant liable for repairs on the basis of
little or no proof.
In an early New Jersey case48 the tenant of a green house allowed
tables therein to become rotten and dilapidated, the roof to become
rotten, unstable and liable to fall down and one of the boilers to break
and remain out of repair. The court held that the tenant was liable for
permissive waste. All of the damages here were readily apparent to
the tenant; thus, it is not difficult to show that the tenant knew of
the need for the repairs and breached his duty in not making them.
9
The case of Fash v. KavanaghO
indicates that the courts may allow other factors to override a possible finding of negligence on the
part of the tenant. It held that a tenant from month to month was not
bound to either see to the erection of a proper sink or privy upon the
premises, or to cause it to be emptied to prevent an overflow. It seems
that the tenant might have been found negligent because of his failure
to stop the overflow, but the court held for the tenant and refused to
allow the landlord to recover for rent accruing after the tenant surrendered possession because of the overflowing privy. The court allowed two factors to override the possibility of the tenant's negligence:
(1) the value of the leasehold (rent and term considered); (2) the
availability of the landlord. The tenant here was a resident of a tenement house renting a single room. The value of such a leasehold is
comparatively small and the landlord or his representative is generally
on the premises.
The factor of custom in the community was suggested by the case
of Breen v. Walters.5 0
The question arises as to whether the tenant is liable for the negligent acts of third persons. It has already been determined that he
is liable for voluntary waste when such third persons commit voluntary acts causing damage to the premises wherever the tenant's conduct invited or exposed the premises to such acts. 51 The courts which
have considered the question have not been in accord. In a New York
case52 it was said that:
(2) a breach of that duty; (3) a reasonably close causal connection between
the conduct and the resulting injury; (4) actual loss or damage; PROSSER,
HORNBOOK on TORTS 165 (2d ed. 1955).
4
8 Newbold v. Brown, 44 N.J.L. 266 (1882).
4924 How. PRAc. 347 (1861).
50 150 La. 578, 91 So. 50 (1922).
51'upra, note 45.
52 Rogers v. Atl., G. & P. Co., supra, note 46.
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"In no case in this state, . . ., has a tenant been held liable as
for permissive waste for the negligent acts of strangers."
However, cases in other jurisdictions have held the tenant liable
for permissive waste caused by the negligent acts of a third person.
In a Missouri case 53 the court said:
"Tenants are answerable for waste committed by a stranger, and
they take their remedy over against him; and it is a general principle that the tenant, without some special agreement to the contrary, is responsible to the reversioner for all injuries amounting to waste done to the premises during his term, by whomsoever the injuries may have been committed,.... The tenant is
like a common carrier, and the law, in this instance, is founded
on the same great principles of public policy."
In a Massachusetts case,54 a plate-glass window in the leased premises was broken through the negligence of a complete stranger without fault on the part of the tenant. The court held the tenant liable.
This case seems to indicate that a tenant is liable for permissive waste
when damage is occasioned by the negligence of a complete stranger. 55
An old Missouri case seems to indicate that a tenant will be similarly
liable for damage occasioned by the negligence of his employee.5 6
These cases have been cited by some textwriters as indicating liability
on the part of the tenant.5 7 However, it seems that these old cases
which hold the tenant liable for the negligence of a complete stranger
are open to criticism. They were decided at a time prior to the emergence of the modern short-term periodic tenancy as a major class
of tenancy; and, like the early common law, they exhibited an obvious
bias in favor of the landlord. It is believed that the rule is not as broad
as these cases indicate.
The English cases involving the repair obligation of a periodic tenant in the absence of covenant have attacked the problem in a somewhat different manner. They have, generally, avoided any mention
of the term "waste."
"In the English cases. . ., in which an obligation to make repairs
is asserted as against a tenant from year to year, the failure to
make them is not termed permissive waste, and the obligation
seems rather to be based upon an implied agreement . . .,,In an early case, 59 in which a periodic tenant damaged the ceiling
and walls of a building by the removal of shelves and pictures thereMason v. Stiles, 21 Mo. 374, at 375 (1855).
54 Leominster Fuel Co. v. Scanlon, 243 Mass. 126, 137 N.E. 271 (1922).
55Ibid.
56 Supra, note 53.
57 2 Tiffany, REAL PROPERTY 655 (3rd ed. 1939) ; A7-, JUR., LANDLORD & TENANT
669.
58 2 Tiffany, REAL PROPERTY 651 (3rd ed. 1939).
59 Horsefall v. Mather, 171 Eng. Rep. 141 (1815) ; noted in 9 ENG. RuE. CAs. 465.
53
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from, it was held that the tenant was not liable to the landlord. The
court said that a periodic tenant is bound only to use the premises
in a "husband-like" manner. The court seemed to place much weight
on the fact that the landlord was put to only small expense in refitting
the premises. This suggests another factor which the courts will consider: the extent of the repairs to be made, as measured by cost. Is
the repair a major or minor one?
In 1832, the English court stated the tenant's obligation in terms
of the ability of the premises to withstand the action of the elements.
Auworth v. Johnson0 said that a tenant from year to year is bound
only to keep premises wind and water tight. In 1916, the English court
combined the terms "husband-like manner" and "wind and water tight"
in a statement of the tenant's repair obligation;61 and in 1927, the
court resorted to the use of the term "tenant-like manner" when it said
that the tenant is under an implied obligation, in the absence of con'62
venant, to use the premises in a "tenant-like manner.
The latest expression of the English court came down in the 1953
case of Warran v. Keen. The case involved a tenant from week to
week. The alleged items of disrepair were: (1) decay of interior plaster and paint work; (2) a leak in the hot water boiler. The court said
again that the only duty of the tenant is to use the premises in a tenantlike manner.6 3 It refused to hold the tenant liable and in so doing suggested another factor which the courts will consider: the ratio between the cost of the repair and the rent for the period for which the
tenant is assured of possession. It said:
"It is difficult to think of repairs which would not in themselves
cost more than the weekly rent in many cases ...,"
The failure of the English cases to mention waste raises the question of remedies. There are basically two possible remedies for a tenant's failure to make repairs: (1) a tort action for waste; (2) an action for breach of the covenant to repair or to return the premises in
as good condition as when received. By their failure to mention waste
it seems that the English courts indicate a preference for the use of the
action for breach of covenant. American courts, it seems, recognize
both remedies. Thus, Tiffany says:
"The right to recover damages for waste is not affected by the
fact that the lease contains an express covenant not to commit
waste, or to yield up the premises in good condition at the end of
60 5 Carr. & P. 239, 172 Eng. Rep. 955 (1832) ; accord, Leach v. Thomas, 7 Carr.

& P. 327, 173 Eng. Rep. 145 (1855).

01 Wedd v. Porter, 2 K.B. 91 (1916).

Marsden v. Heyes. 2 K.B. 1 (1927).
63 Warren v. Keen, 1 Q.B. 15, at 20 (1953).
6r4
Ibid., at 19.
62
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the term. The landlord has the option of suing on the convenant
or of bringing an action on the case, .

. .,

directly for waste."'65

When the action is on the covenant, it seems that there is no necessity of proving negligence on the part of the tenant. The courts
base their decision upon the question of whether or not the repairs
come within the express or implied words of the covenant. All the
landlord needs to show is that the repairs come within the convenant.
and that they have not been made. 66
V.

ANALOGY TO CASES

INVOLVING EXPRESS CONVENANTS

Because of the paucity of cases in the appellate courts of this country involving a periodic tenant's repair obligation in the absence of
express covenant 7 it will be profitable to draw an anaolgy between
cases in which the courts have implied covenant" and cases in which
similar covenants have been expressly inserted in the lease by the
parties.69
The case of Leominster Fuel Co. v. Scanlon70 involved a covenant
to make tenantable repairs. A plate-glass window in the leased premises
was broken through the negligence of a complete stranger who ran
into it from the street. The tenant brought an action against the landlord to recover the cost of replacing the window. The court held for
the landlord. This case is not cited because the writer approves of its
result. It seems that the result should have been in the tenant's favor
under the modern doctrine because of the landlords failure to show
negligence upon the part of the tenant. The case is cited 71 only because
it does sugest some factors which courts may consider in determining
whether or not to hold a tenant liable for repairs. The factors sugeested are: (1) the availability of the landlord; (2) the threat of progressive damages arising out of the initial damage. In a case involving
a broken window or other injury causing a breach in the sheathing
of the premises so as to render them something less than wind and
water tight, there is a definite threat of steadily increasing damage
to the interior of the building if the breach is allowed to remain. This
factor of threat of progressive damages is also indicated in other
7 2

cases.

65 2 Tiffany, REAL PROPERTY 663 (3rd ed. 1939).
66 Cases in which the action was on the covenant:

67
6S

Van Wormer v. Crane,
supra, note 32; Leahy v. WVenonah Theater Co., 251 Mich. 594, 232 N.W.
184 (1930).
See supra, note 1.
See supra, notes 32 & 33.

G9 There are three main types of express covenants as set forth in the case of

Finnegan v. McGavock, 230 Wis. 212, 283 N.W. 321 (1939). They are: (1) a
covenant to surrender the premises in as good condition as when received,
reasonable wear and tear excepted; (2) a covenant to repair; (3) a covenant
granting abatement of rent.
70 Supra, note 54.
71 Ibid.
72

Proudfoot v. Hart, L.R. 25 Q.B. Div. 42 (1890), held that the fact that a
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It would be well to examine some cases involving covenants to
surrender the premises in as good condition as when first received,
reasonable wear and tear excepted. Is there any basic difference in
legal effect between these covenants and covenants to make ordinary
tenantable repairs? It would seem not.
"A covenant to deliver up the premises in as 73good condition
as when received is really a covenant to repair."
The distinction seems to lie only in the manner of approaching the
problem. In the case of a covenant, express or implied, to make ordinary tenantable repairs, the essence of the problem is whether or not
the repair in question comes within the definition of "ordinary tenantable repairs." In the case of a covenant to surrender the premises in
as good condition as when first received, reasonable wear and tear excepted, the preliminary inquiry is whether the premises were surrendered in as good condition; if not, then the crucial inquiry must be as
to whether the alleged damages were caused by reasonable wear and
tear. Thus, most cases involving such covenants turn upon the term
"reasonable wear and tear." Such a covenant was construed in Davenport v. U.S.74 ; the Court indicated the difficulty in the area when it
said:
"To mark the line between the repairs which would have been
needed because of the ordinary wear and tear and those needed
because of the improper use by the defendants has been somewhat difficult. There is no fixed rule of law or fact, which
enables a court to distinguish between the two classes of damage."
"While the lessor is entitled to receive his property in good condition, 'wear and tear' excepted, he is not entitled to charge the
lessee with all the decay and damage that may have happened
during the continuanace of the lease."
The same type covenant was interpreted in Kann v. Brooks.75 The
court said:
... an agreement to turn over the premises at the end of the
term in as good condition as they were . . .in does not require
window was broken as the result of a storm, or other external agency, does
not relieve the tenant of his duty to replace it under a covenant to make
tenantable repairs.
In Suydam v. Jackson, supra, note 32. at 454, it is said:
"If a window in a dwelling should blow in, the tenant could not permit it
to remain out and the storms to beat in and greatly injure the premises
without liability tor permissive waste; .
1 A-.r. LAv OF PROPERTY 350 (st ed. 1952).

73
74 26
75 54

Ct. Cl. 338 (1891). at 343.
Ind. App. 625, 101 N.E. 513 (1913), at 515. This case involved the lease of a
stone mill, the court said:
"The reasonable wear and tear of a stone mill, and the machinery, tools,
and equipment belonging thereto, would necessarily include decay of
timbers, the wearing out and giving way of various parts of the buildings,
machinery, tools, and other parts of the plant and its equipment."
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the tenant to make good to the landlord depreciation due to such
wear and tear of the premises as is incident to the use for which
they were leased."
In Finnegan v. Mc Gavock16 the Wisconsin Court held that such a
covenant did not require the tenant to reconstruct a wooden coal elevator that had become unusuable by gradual slow deterioration produced by heat, cold, rain and other weather conditions.
VI. STATUTES

ALLOWING

SURRENDER OF

POSSESSION

WITHOUT

LIABILITY FOR RENT

What is the effect of a statute which allows the tenant to surrender
possession, without liability for rent subsequent to the surrender of
possession, if the premises become untenantable and unfit for occupancy "without his fault or neglect." 77 The problem is whether a failure on the part of the tenant to make tenantable repairs, or to return
the premises in as good condition as when received, excludes him from
the statutory phrase "without his fault or neglect" so as to bar the
tenant from using the statute as a defense.
In Suydam v. Jacksons the roof of the leased premises began to
leak and the tenant gave notice that the premises were untenantable
and surrendered possession of them. (The roof had been worn out
by the action of the elements and by age.) The tenant set up as a defense to the landlords' action for rent the New York statute.7 9 The
court allowed the landlord to recover the rent. It found that these
were repairs which should have been made by the tenant. The court
said, in effect, that the statute was not intended to have any effect
upon the rule requiring the tenant to make ordinary tenantable repairs. Thus, it seems that the court found that the failure to make tenantable repairs was such "fault or neglect" on the part of the tenant
as to ban him from invoking the protection of the statute.
7 Supra, note 69.
77 WIs. STATS. §234.17 (1955) :Lessee may surrender premises when. Where any
building, which is leased or occupied, is destroyed or so injured by the elements, or any other cause as to be untenantable, and unfit for occupancy, and
no express agreement to the contrary has been made in writing, the lessee or
occupant may, if the destruction or injury occurred without his fault ol
neglect, quit and surrender possession of the leasehold premises, and of the
land so leased or occupied; and he is not liable to pay to the lessor or owner,
rent for the time subsequent to the surrender,"
78
79

Supra, note 32.
LAws OF 1860, ch. 345, provided:
"... that the lessees or occupants of any building, which shall, without
fault or neglect on their part, be destroyed or be so injured by the elements
or any other cause as to be untenantable and unfit for occupancy, shall
not be liable or bound to pay rent to the lessors or owners thereof, after
such destruction or injury, unless otherwise expressly provided by written
agreement or covenant; and the

lessees

or occupants may thereupon quit

and surrender possession of the leasehold premises, and of the land so

leased or occupied."
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In May v. Gillis0 the statute involved was a substantial re-enactment of the statute involved in the Suydam case.81 It was also identical
to the present Wisconsin statute, Sec 234.17.82 A heavy fall of snow
caused part of the roof to give way and the city building department
tore down the rest of the roof because of its unsafe condition. The
tenant moved out and the landlord brought action to recover the rent.
The trial court held for the landlord. The appellate court reversed,
ordered a new trial, and said that a covenant on the part of the lessee
to repair would not prevent the tenant from availing himself of the
statute; read in connection with the statute it would bind the tenant to
repair subject to the qualification that, in case the premises should be
destroyed or should become untenantable without his fault, he might
abandon them and terminate the lease. The court went on to say that
if the tenant is to be held liable there must be a necessary implication
from the lease of an intention that the rent should continue, notwithstanding the occurrence of the events mentioned in the statute. It is
3
believed that this case is in complete accord with Suydam v. Jackson.
The opposite result at which the court arrived can be distinguished
on the facts. Here, the damage was caused by a heavy fall of snow.
This may be considered an act of God, 4 and is thus within one of the
exceptions to the tenant's obligation to repair.
It therefore seems that these statutes will not have any effect upon
the tenant's basic obligation to make ordinary tenantable repairs, or
to return the premises in as good condition as when received, and if
the tenant fails to comply with this obligation he is guilty of such
"fault or neglect" as will bar him from invoking the protection of
the statute.
VII. CONCLUSION

As was stated in the body of this article, there is a decided paucity
of recent appellate court decisions involving the repair obligation of
a periodic tenant in the absence of covenant. The textwriters, possibly
because of the paucity of modern decisions, have shown a distinct
tendency to follow indiscriminately the reasoning of the old cases. It
should be noted that the basic circumstances of the landlord-tenant
relationship have changed since most of these old cases were decided.
Most landlords are no longer absentee landlords as they were at common law. Today the landlord, or his representative, is generally available at least once a month, when the rent is collected, if not oftener.
Thus, there is little danger of damage being done to the property
without the landlord's knowledge.
so 169 N.Y. 330, 62 N.E. 385 (1901).
81 Supra, note 32.
82 Supra, note 77.
83 Supra, note 32.
84 Supra, note 36.
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The courts, in determining whether or not to hold a periodic tenant
liable for any given repair, will first consider one key factor: the extent to which the tenant is involved in causing the initial damage; that
it, whether the waste is voluntary or permissive. When the damage
results from an act on the part of the tenant himself, other than acts
in the ordinary course of occupancy, the courts will classify it as
voluntary waste and hold the tenant liable for repairs. When the damage is the result of nonaction on the part of the tenant, the landlord,
to establish permissive waste, must prove that the tenant was negligent in failing to act to prevent the damage.
When the damage results from the act or ommission of a third
person who is a complete stranger to the tenant, the tenant will generally not be held liable to make the repairs, with one caveat: in a case
where the tenant's act or ommission to act invited, or exposed the
premises to, damages resulting from such act or ommission on the
part of the third person, the tenant will probably be held liable. The
tenant may be said to be negligent in inviting, or exposing the premises
to, damages.
When the tenant is not in any way involved in causing the initial
damage; that is, when it is the result of purely natural forces or of an
act of God, the tenant is generally not liable. In this situation the
tenant cannot be said to be negligent. Repairs occasioned by an act of
God are beyond the limits of what is reasonable and usual.
Within the framework of these general rules the courts will consider a number of other factors:
(1) A threat of progressive damage if the repair is not made immediately.-The most common situation would be that of a broken
window or a leaky roof. If the repair is not made immediately, there
is a distinct threat of much greater damage to the interior of the
premises. Failure to make such repairs is a departure from the standard
of conduct of a reasonable tenant. The courts will readily find the
tenant negligent and hold him liable for permissive waste if he does not
make them. He will be liable, if not for the repairs, at least for the
resultant damages.
This factor operates to create a partial exception to the general
rule in cases where the damage to the premises is the result of ordinary
wear and tear or an act of God.
(2) The magnitude of the repair as measured by its cost.-The
courts will be very reluctant to hold a tenant liable when the cost of
the repair is either very small or very large. Very low cost repairs are
often within the area of ordinary wear and tear. Extremely costly
repairs are within the area of substantial repairs and are likely to be
ruled beyond the reasonable scope of the implied repair obligation.
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Under this factor the courts will also consider the value of the
leasehold, as measured by rent and term, and the ratio between the
cost of the repair and the rent for the period of time for which the
tenant is assured of possession. Even if it can be shown that the tenant was negligent in failing to make the repair, the court is not likely
to burden him with repair costs which are greater than the rental value
for the shortest period of time in which he can be evicted. To do so
would encourage the landlord to evict a periodic tenant shortly after
the tenant had made costly repairs and re-rent the premises at a higher
rate.
(3) The purpose for which the premises were let.-If the tenant
uses the premises for unusual or unauthorized purposes, the courts
will find that his act in departure from the contemplated use of the
premises was not the conduct of a reasonable tenant. He will be liable,
as for voluntary waste, on account of all damage incident to such use.
(4) Community custom as to which party usually makes such repairs.-If the repair is one which ordinarily is made by tenants in
the particular area, the courts will more readily hold the tenant negligent in not making such repair.
Under the early common law, the principal, if not the sole factor
considered on the issue of the tenant's liability for repairs was the
tenant's right of exclusive control. Because of this right the fact of
tenancy presupposed an obligation to repair. It is the writer's conclusion that the modem law reverses this principle. If the landlord
desires to hold the tenant liable for waste, he must assume the burden of proving one of three things: (1) voluntary waste by the tenant;
(2) permissive waste: that is, negligence and the fact that there are
no other factors present to override the finding of negligence; or (3)
damages to the premises of such an aggravated nature as to raise at
least an inference of negligence, (a presumption in some states),
through the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
HARRY G. HOLZ

